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Linda S. Mullenix* 
INTRODUCTION 
Professor Stephen Subrin’s long and illustrious career tilling in the civil 
procedure vineyard has resulted in an influential body of work addressing myr-
iad aspects of procedural justice. Over a span of more than four decades, Pro-
fessor Subrin has borne witness to vast sea-changes in procedural law and has 
written about, debated, lobbied (for or against), and taught much of the modern 
history of federal civil procedure. His writings have focused on such diverse 
topics as the rulemaking process,1 the concept of transsubstantive procedure,2 
civil discovery,3 alternative dispute resolution,4 trials and judging,5 and civil 
rights litigation.6 He also has been a faithful champion of legal history, includ-
                                                        
*  Morris & Rita Atlas Chair in Advocacy, University of Texas School of Law. 
1  Steve Subrin, Charles E. Clark and His Procedural Outlook: The Disciplined Champion of 
Undisciplined Rules, in JUDGE CHARLES E. CLARK, NEW YORK UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
INGRAM DOCUMENTS IN LEGAL HISTORY (P. Petruck ed., 1991); Steve Subrin, Daniel Coquil-
lette & Mary Squires, Federal Rules, Local Rules, and State Rules: Uniformity, Divergence, 
and Merging Procedural Patterns, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1999 (1989); Steve Subrin, The Role 
of Local Rules, 75 A.B.A. J. 62 (1982); Steve Subrin, Uniformity in Procedural Rules and 
the Attributes of a Sound Procedural System, The Case for Presumptive Limits, 49 ALA. L. 
REV. 79 (1997). 
2  Steve Subrin, The Limitations of Transsubstantive Procedure: An Essay on Adjusting the 
“One Size Fits All Assumption”, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 337 (2010). 
3  Steve Subrin, Discovery in Global Perspective: Are We Nuts?, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 299 
(2002); Steve Subrin, Fishing Expeditions Allowed: The Historical Background of the 1938 
Federal Discovery Rules, 39 B.C. L. REV. 691 (1998); Steve Subrin, Fudge Points and Thin 
Ice in Discovery Reform and the Case for Selective Substance-Specific Procedure, 46 FLA. 
L. REV. 27 (1994). 
4  Steve Subrin, A Traditionalist Looks at Mediation: It’s Here to Stay and Much Better Than 
I Thought, 3 NEV. L.J. 196 (2003). 
5  Steve Subrin & Stephen B. Burbank, Litigation and Democracy: Restoring a Realistic 
Prospect of Trial, 46 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 399 (2011); Steve Subrin, Thoughts on Mis-
judging Misjudging, 7 NEV. L.J. 513 (2007). 
6  Steve Subrin, Ashcroft v. Iqbal: Contempt for Rules, Statutes, the Constitution and Ele-
mental Fairness, 12 NEV. L.J. (2102); Steve Subrin & A.R. Dykstar, Notice and the Right to 
Be Heard: The Significance of Old Friends, 9 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 449 (1974); Steve 
Subrin, P. Baumann & J. Brown, Some Thoughts About Social Perception and Employment 
Discrimination Law: A Modest Proposal for Reopening the Judicial Dialogue, 46 EMORY 
L.J. 1487 (1987); Steve Subrin, P. Baumann & J. Brown, Substance in the Shadow of Proce-
dure: The Integration of Substantive and Procedural Law in Title VII Cases, 33 B.C. L REV. 
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ing interpretation of history to contribute to an understanding of the Rules Ena-
bling Act as it exerts limits on the rulemaking function.7 
Within the context of this impressive body of legal scholarship, Professor 
Subrin perhaps is chiefly renowned for his much-cited, highly influential arti-
cle, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure in Historical Perspective.8 Professor Subrin’s article chronicled the extent 
to which the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were based on equity rather than 
the common law (hence, describing how equity “conquered” the common 
law).9 This article, then—in tribute to Professor Subrin’s contribution to our 
collective thinking about the influence of equity on modern civil procedure—
focuses on the American class action rule10 and the aggregate litigation move-
ment that has evolved over the span of Professor Subrin’s forty-year career. 
Arguably, of all the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Rule 23 class ac-
tion is the rule most patently grounded in equity. Class actions truly are a crea-
ture of equity. As we are constantly reminded, prior to the promulgation of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938, the modern Rule 23 class action had 
its antecedents in the English Chancery Bill of Peace and Equity Rules 28 and 
38.11 Whatever may be said of other Federal Rules, class action litigation re-
mains the arena where equity still holds pervasive sway in jurisprudential ar-
guments and judicial opinions. Hence, lawyers and judges alike frequently 
make recourse to the trope that Rule 23 class actions are creatures of equity.12 
                                                                                                                                
211 (1992); Steve Subrin, J. Brown & D. Givelber, Treating Blacks as if They Were White: 
Problems of Definition and Proof in Section 1982 Cases, 124 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1975). 
7  Steve Subrin, David Dudley Field and the Field Code: A Historical Analysis of an Earlier 
Procedural Vision, 6 LAW & HIST. REV. 311 (1988); see also Subrin, Charles E. Clark, su-
pra note 1. 
8  Steve Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909 (1987). 
9  See also Steve Subrin, The Empirical Challenge of Procedure Based in Equity: How Can 
Equity Procedure Be Made More Equitable?, in EQUITY AND CONTEMPORARY LEGAL 
PROBLEMS 761 (1992). 
10  FED. R. CIV. P. 23. 
11  See generally 7A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY KAY KANE, 
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1751 (1986) (history and purpose of the class action 
rule, citing to the English Court of Chancery Bill of Peace, and Federal equity Rules 48 and 
38). 
12  See, e.g., Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 832 (1999) (class actions developed as 
exception to formal rigidity of necessary party rule in equity); Amchem Prods. Inc. v. Wind-
sor, 521 U.S. 591, 613 (1997) (Rule 23 stems from equity practice); Phillips Petroleum Co. 
v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 808 (1985) (class action was invention of equity); Brief for W.R. 
Huff Asset Management Co., L.L.C. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner, Pub. Emps.’ 
Ret. Sys. of Miss. v. IndyMac MBS, Inc., 2014 WL 2361890 (U.S. May 28, 2014) (No. 13-
640), at 16 (noting class action developed from equity jurisprudence); Brief for the Petition-
er, Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 2009 WL 2040421 (U.S. July 
10, 2009) (No. 08-1008), at 29–30 (“In short, Rule 23 creates a procedural device to serve 
procedural ends. In so doing, it follows in a long tradition of the use of class litigation by 
federal courts. Class action procedures were developed by the federal courts sitting in equity 
to allow adjudication of rights common to groups of litigants too numerous for joinder, and 
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In addition, at least some federal judges—most notably Judge Jack Wein-
stein of the Eastern District of New York—have frequently invoked Rule 23’s 
equitable roots as the basis for adventuresome resolution of complex class liti-
gation involving both private and public social justice issues.13 Judges similarly 
have invoked the courts’ equitable powers in support of the creation of the so-
called “quasi-class action.”14 And at least one judge relied on Rule 23’s equita-
ble basis as a rationale authorizing the court to order an opt-in procedure for a 
Rule 23(b)(3) damage class action,15 an extension of the court’s equitable pow-
ers in the class action arena that the Second Circuit Court of Appeals subse-
quently (and swiftly) rejected.16 
As a scholar deeply invested in the equitable roots of civil procedure, the 
arc of Professor Subrin’s academic career has neatly traversed the arc of mod-
ern class action litigation. The modern era of class litigation began with the 
1966 amendments to Rule 23.17 As a putative child (actually, young adult) of 
the 1960s and an emerging legal scholar in the 1970s, Professor Subrin turned 
his early attentions to the use of class litigation in the civil rights arena.18 His 
attention to the procedural efficacy of class litigation in the civil rights arena 
reflected the first decade of class litigation after the 1966 Rule 23 amendments 
went into effect, a period characterized by the emergence and domination of a 
new paradigm of public law and institutional reform litigation.19 This era of 
class litigation was exemplified by cases contesting school desegregation, chal-
                                                                                                                                
the principles developed in such cases were later incorporated into the Federal Equity Rules. 
This Court long ago recognized that the Equity Rules’ provision for class actions was a valid 
exercise of the federal courts’ inherent (as well as statutorily conferred) power to regulate 
their own procedures.” (citing Supreme Tribe of Ben Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356, 363–64 
(1921))). 
13  See, e.g., In re Simon II Litig., 211 F.R.D. 86, 104 (E.D.N.Y. 2002), vacated, 407 F.3d 
125 (2d Cir. 2003) (class action based on equity practice flexible enough to assure fair reme-
dy and due process in vexing tobacco litigation); In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 
129 B.R. 710, 803 (S.D.N.Y. 1991), vacated, 982 F.2d 721 (2d Cir. 1993) (“It is this princi-
ple of fashioning remedies where none exist at law that underlies Rule 23 and justifies its 
application to this complex of asbestos cases. Rule 23 is a child of equity.”). 
14  See, e.g., In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 650 F. Supp. 2d 549, 553–54 (E.D. La. 2009) 
(quasi-class action conferring on court equitable authority to review contingent fee contracts 
for reasonableness); In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 433 F. Supp. 2d 268, 271 (E.D.N.Y. 
2006) (quasi-class action subject to general equitable powers of the court). 
15  See In re Ski Train Fire in Kaprun, Austria on Nov. 11, 2000, 220 F.R.D. 195, 220 
(S.D.N.Y. 2003) (invoking equitable powers of the court in class action litigation to order an 
opt-in class). 
16  See Kern v. Siemens, 393 F.3d 120, 128–29 (2d Cir. 2004) (rejecting concept that court’s 
equitable powers in the class action arena extended far enough to supersede the requirements 
of Rule 23). 
17  See WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra note 11, § 1753 (the 1966 revision of Rule 23). 
18  See Steve Subrin & John Sutton, Welfare Class Actions in Federal Court, A Procedural 
Analysis, 8 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 21 (1973); see also Steve Subrin & John Sutton, Class 
Action: Welfare, TRIAL, Jan./Feb. 1974. 
19  See Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 
1281 (1976). 
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lenging conditions of confinement in prisons and mental health facilities, and 
confronting various forms of discriminatory behaviors.20 
However, this initial eagerness to harness the class action to resolve social 
justice problems soon engendered a judicial backlash,21 which resulted in re-
strictive decisions that tempered attorney enthusiasm for pursuing group relief 
through the class action device. By the late 1970s, the so-called “Golden Age” 
of class litigation in the 1960s began to recede. As will be discussed, however, 
the late 1970s marked a shift away from public interest law class litigation to a 
new form of complex litigation vexing the courts: namely, mass tort litigation. 
The era of mass tort litigation, then, marked the beginning of a long and 
gradual shift in collective redress mechanisms away from the class action to al-
ternative forms of non-class aggregate litigation. Over the span of Professor 
Subrin’s academic career—and based on expansive theories of equitable jus-
tice—efforts to accomplish relief for collective harms have transcended the 
class action rule and substituted new forms of largely unrestrained aggregate 
dispute resolution techniques. A new generation of “aggregationists,” building 
on the work of an older generation of “aggregationists,” has ironically aban-
doned the class action or declared it moribund.22 
If the older generation of aggregationists embraced the class action rule as 
the procedural panacea for resolving massive societal harms, a new generation 
of aggregationists has instead turned its back on the class action rule as a disu-
tilitarian vehicle for achieving collective redress. Not only is this true in the ju-
dicial arena, but the new aggregationist movement is championed by a fresh 
generation of academic scholars who often propose extreme approaches to re-
solving aggregate litigation, seemingly unbounded by law.23 It has been ob-
                                                        
20  See, e.g., Hart v. Cmty. Sch. Bd. of Educ., 383 F. Supp. 769 (E.D.N.Y. 1974), aff’d, 512 
F.2d 37 (2d Cir. 1975) (ordering a integration plan for the Mark Twain middle school in Co-
ney Island, Brooklyn); Soc’y for the Good Will to Retarded Children, Inc. v. Cuomo, 572 F. 
Supp. 1300 (E.D.N.Y. 1983) (ordering corrective measures at state institution for mentally 
handicapped children in violation of constitutional rights), vacated, 737 F.2d 1239 (2d Cir. 
1984); Order, Manicone v. Cleary, No. 74 C 575 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 12, 1977) (prisoner access 
to telephones); United States v. Kahane, 396 F. Supp. 687 (E.D.N.Y. 1975) (right of defend-
ants to obtain food meeting dietary requirements); Wilson v. Beame, 380 F. Supp. 1232 
(E.D.N.Y. 1974) (tolerance for Muslim prisoners). 
21  Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974) (allocating costs of sending notice to 
class members on plaintiffs); Zahn v. Int’l Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291 (1973) (requiring that all 
class members in diversity class actions individually satisfy the jurisdictional amount in con-
troversy requirement). 
22  See, e.g., Myriam Gilles, Opting Out of Liability: The Forthcoming Near Total Demise of 
the Modern Class Action, 104 MICH. L. REV. 373 (2005); Robert H. Klonoff, The Decline of 
Class Actions, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 729 (2013); George Rutherglen, Wal-Mart, AT&T Mo-
bility, and the Decline of the Deterrent Class Action, 98 VA. L. REV. in brief 24 (2012); Ben-
jamin Sachs-Michaels, Note, The Demise of Class Actions Will Not Be Televised, 12 
CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 665 (2011). 
23  See, e.g., Sergio J. Campos, Mass Torts and Due Process, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1059 (2012) 
(arguing in favor of taking away claimant’s autonomy in mass tort class actions); Sergio J. 
Campos, Proof of Classwide Injury, 37 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 751 (2102) (proof of classwide 
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served that it is the inevitable role of the next generation of legal scholars to re-
act against the theories and policies of their mentors; the new generation of 
young scholars have forsaken their predecessors and embraced new aggrega-
tionist theories. 
I was an aggregationist of the old-school variety. Similar to many of my 
procedural colleagues, I was swept up by the great aggregationist movement 
inspired by the mass tort litigation crisis of the 1980s. I readily joined the pro-
cedural reform bandwagon urging expanded use of the class action rule (and 
related doctrinal jurisprudence) to address mass tort injuries.24 But the twenty-
first century, observing the gradual transformation of class action litigation into 
something else, prompted my reconsideration of the wisdom of aggregate pro-
cedure. For reasons explained below, I now consider myself to be a recovering 
aggregationist. And I am not alone in such rethinking.25 
I. THE ORIGINS OF THE AGGREGATE LITIGATION MOVEMENT, 1986–1996 
As indicated above, by the late 1970s the great era of civil rights class ac-
tion litigation was in retreat or hibernation, largely the victim of increasing ju-
dicial resistance to such cases. At approximately the same time as this denoue-
ment, the problem of mass tort litigation began to emerge on federal and state 
dockets. The story of first generation mass tort litigation has been well-
documented in several book-length treatments.26 These well-known cases in-
                                                                                                                                
injury should not be necessary to certify a class action); Sergio J. Campos & Howard M. Er-
ichson, The Future of Mass Torts, 159 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 231 (2011); Brian T. 
Fitzpatrick, Do Class Action Lawyers Make Too Little?, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 2043 (2010) (ar-
guing the 100 percent awards should be made to class counsel in small claims consumer cas-
es to ensure maximum deterrent effect of such class actions); see generally Howard M. Er-
ichson & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Consent Versus Closure, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 265 (2011) 
(discussing problems with non-class aggregate settlements); Thomas E. Willging & Emery 
G. Lee III, From Class Actions to Multidistrict Consolidations: Aggregate Mass Tort Litiga-
tion After Ortiz, 58 U. KAN. L. REV. 775 (2010) (trend to non-class aggregate settlements). 
24  See generally Linda S. Mullenix, Beyond Consolidation: Post-Aggregative Procedure in 
Asbestos Mass Tort Litigation, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 475 (1991); Linda S. Mullenix, 
Class Resolution of the Mass Tort Case: A Proposed Federal Procedure Act, 64 
TEX. L. REV. 1039 (l986); Linda S. Mullenix, Federalizing Choice of Law in Mass Tort Liti-
gation, 70 TEX. L. REV. 1623 (1992). 
25  Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Disaggregation, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 667 (2013); Eduardo 
C. Robreno, The Federal Asbestos Product Liability Multidistrict Litigation (MDL-875): 
Black Hole or New Paradigm?, 23 WIDENER L.J. 97 (2013); Georgene M. Vairo, Lessons 
Learned by the Reporter: Is Disaggregation the Answer to the Asbestos Mess, 88 TUL. L. 
REV. 1039 (2014). 
26  See, e.g., PAUL BRODEUR, OUTRAGEOUS MISCONDUCT: THE ASBESTOS INDUSTRY ON TRIAL 
(1986); MICHAEL D. GREEN, BENDECTIN AND BIRTH DEFECTS: THE CHALLENGES OF MASS 
TOXIC SUBSTANCES LITIGATION (1996); MORTON MINTZ, AT ANY COST: CORPORATE GREED, 
WOMEN, AND THE DALKON SHIELD (1985); PETER H. SCHUCK, AGENT ORANGE ON TRIAL: 
MASS TOXIC DISASTERS IN THE COURTS (Belknap Press 1986); JACK B. WEINSTEIN, 
INDIVIDUAL JUSTICE IN MASS TORT LITIGATION (1995); DAVID WEIR, THE BHOPAL 
SYNDROME (1987). 
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cluded asbestos, Agent Orange, the Dalkon Shield, DES, and Bendectin litiga-
tion.27 
The emergence of mass tort litigation inspired the creation of the first gen-
eration of dedicated aggregationists. This aggregation movement was advanced 
by five major developments: (1) an emerging crisis mentality in the judicial 
system, (2) the studies by various institutional reform organizations, (3) the ac-
tions of an array of aggregationist judges, (4) the efforts of judicial surrogates, 
and (5) the scholarly contributions of academic camp followers who enthusias-
tically joined the aggregationist movement.28 
The mass toxic substance, defective medical device, and pharmaceutical 
cases shared several characteristics that suggested the arrival of a new form of 
litigation that was unlike the civil rights and institutional reform cases of the 
1960s. First and foremost was the sheer volume of mass tort cases filed in fed-
eral and state courts. The litigation also was characterized by problems relating 
to geographic dispersion, latent injury, indeterminate plaintiffs and defendants, 
and complex issues of causation and scientific proof.29 By the mid-1980s, some 
federal and state judges were seized by a “crisis mentality,” provoked by the 
wave of new mass tort cases filed in their courts and consequent problem of 
docket congestion. 
As judges struggled to manage the mass tort litigation on their dockets, vir-
tually all major institutional reform organizations initiated research projects to 
study the new phenomenon of mass tort litigation and propose recommenda-
tions to address the burgeoning problems related to it.30 While the institutional 
                                                        
27  See BRODEUR, supra note 26; GREEN, supra note 26; MINTZ, supra note 26; SCHUCK, su-
pra note 26; WEINSTEIN, supra note 26; WEIR, supra note 26. 
28  Myself included: see Mullenix, Beyond Consolidation: Post-Aggregative Procedure in 
Asbestos Mass Tort Litigation, supra note 24; Mullenix, Class Resolution of the Mass 
Tort Case: A Proposed Federal Procedure Act, supra note 24; Mullenix, Federalizing 
Choice of Law in Mass Tort Litigation, supra note 24. 
29  See AM. LAW INST., REPORTER’S STUDY ON ENTERPRISE RESPONSIBILITY FOR PERSONAL 
INJURY VOL. II, at 389–93 (1991) (defining the salient characteristics of a mass tort action). 
30  There was a flurry of such efforts from the mid-1980s through the early 1990s. See gen-
erally AM. LAW INST., COMPLEX LITIGATION: STATUTORY RECOMMENDATIONS AND ANALYSIS 
(1994) (studying mass tort phenomenon and recommending changes to the multidistrict liti-
gation statute and a federalized choice-of-law regime); supra note 29, at 389–93 (defining 
the problem of mass tort litigation); AM. BAR ASS’N, REVISED REPORT OF THE ABA 
COMMISSION ON MASS TORTS (1990), 58 U.S.L.W 2747, 2477 (1990) (studying mass tort 
litigation and making recommendations concerning handling of litigation arising out of sin-
gle event disasters or negligent product design); REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY 
COMMITTEE (April 2, 1990) (part of the 1988 Judicial Improvements Act; containing three 
recommendations relating to complex litigation); REPORT OF THE AD HOC COMMITTEE ON 
ASBESTOS LITIGATION (the Reavley Committee Report March 1991) (recommending that 
Congress consider a national legislative scheme for resolution of asbestos personal injury 
claims or new statutory authority for consolidation and collective trials of asbestos cases; 
also recommending that Advisory Committee on Civil Rules study amendments to Rule 23 
to accommodate requirements of mass tort cases); Mark A. Peterson & Molly Selvin, Reso-
lution of Mass Torts: Toward a Framework for Evaluation of Aggregative Procedures vii, at 
31–37 (1988). In addition to these institutional studies, other legislative bodies were actively 
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reform organizations studied the problem of mass tort litigation and issued as-
sorted task force reports, studies, and projects, these efforts typically were ac-
companied by tepid or conservative recommendations unlikely to assist judges 
grappling with the burdens of with mass tort dockets. In addition, against this 
background of a crisis in the courts, Congress declined to act on any legislative 
initiatives to address various mass tort problems. 
In the face of legislative inaction and tepid reform recommendations, a se-
ries of federal judges thus seized the initiative to discover or invent new man-
agement techniques for dealing with mass tort litigation. The new universe of 
aggregationist judges were impelled by several motivating forces: the need to 
consolidate similar cases into one aggregate group; the need to foreclose repeti-
tive relitigation of essentially the same case; and the need to alleviate docket 
congestion. For many of the aggregationist judges, the prospect of individual 
relitigation of essentially the same tort claim became untenable, because indi-
vidual litigants at the end of the judicial queue might die before having their 
claims adjudicated. Thus, for many aggregationist judges faced with such 
dockets, a rallying sentiment became the adage that justice delayed was justice 
denied. 
Not surprising, the emerging judicial aggregationists of this period consist-
ed of a small coterie of federal district court judges handling large mass tort 
dockets. These included Judge Jack Weinstein of the Eastern District of New 
York, handling the Agent Orange litigation; Judge Robert Parker of the Eastern 
District of Texas, Judge Lowell A. Reed, and Judge James McGirr Kelly of the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania, handling large asbestos dockets; Judge Carl 
Rubin of the Southern District of Ohio, handling the Bendectin litigation; Judge 
Sam Pointer of the Southern District of Alabama, handling breast implant cas-
es; Judge Mehrige of the Eastern District of Virginia, handling the Dalkon 
Shield litigation; and Judge John Grady of the Northern District of Illinois, 
handling the tainted blood products cases. In addition, Judge William 
Schwartzer of the Northern District of California, another leading judicial ag-
gregationist, became the Director of the Federal Judicial Center in 1989 where 
                                                                                                                                
involved in proposing legislation to address the emerging problems relating to mass tort liti-
gation. See, e.g., The Multiparty, Multiforum Jurisdiction Act of 1993 (H.R. 1100, 103rd 
Cong., 1st Sess.) (1993 version of a succession of acts to deal with mass tort cases, intended 
to amend Title 28 to add a new section on multiparty, multi-forum jurisdiction and to amend 
28 U.S.C. § 1407 to permit trial of transferred actions. A watered down version of this legis-
lation, conferring diversity jurisdiction over civil actions arising from single accidents, was 
subsequently enacted in 2002; see the Multiparty, Multiforum Trial Jurisdiction Act, codi-
fied at 28 U.S.C. § 1369 (2012)); National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State 
Laws, Uniform Transfer of Litigation Act (1991) (establishing a framework for transferring 
and consolidating cases in state courts); see also Deborah H. Hensler, Resolving Mass Toxic 
Torts: Myths and Realities, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 89, 89–90 (1989) (noting the burgeoning 
interest in mass tort litigation and institutional law reform efforts underway in the mid-
1980s). 
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he used his position to exercise considerable influence in promoting and ad-
vancing the aggregationist agenda.31 
Collectively, these federal judges inspired a decade of innovative ap-
proaches to dealing with mass tort litigation that centered on expansive use of 
the class action rule. This impetus for these creative reform efforts followed a 
decade of federal judicial resistance to certify mass tort class actions.32 By the 
mid-1980s, mass tort judges were considerably frustrated by the inertia of the 
judiciary and legislative branches to address the growing problems of mass tort 
cases. Several appellate courts finally breached the mass tort logjam in 1986 
and 1987, when the Second, Third, and Fifth Circuits upheld class certification 
in the Agent Orange and asbestos mass tort cases,33 thereby vindicating the ef-
forts of Judges Parker, Kelly, and Weinstein to resolve their mass tort dockets. 
The procedural breakthrough that federal appellate courts accomplished in 
1986–1987 unleashed a decade of judicial activism and experimentation in the 
class action arena. During this period judges experimented with (and approved) 
novel multiphase class action trial plans,34 limited issue classes,35 statistical 
damage sampling,36 and eventually the settlement class.37 
                                                        
31  See William W. Schwartzer, Structuring Multiclaim Litigation: Should Rule 23 Be Re-
vised?, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1250 (1996); William W. Schwartzer et al., Judicial Federalism in 
Action: Coordination of Litigation in State and Federal Courts, 78 VA. L. REV. 1689 (1992); 
see also William W. Schwartzer, Reforming Jury Trials, 132 F.R.D. 575 (1991) (discussing 
jury’s inability to understand complex issues); WILLIAM W. SCHWARTZER, MANAGING 
ANTITRUST AND OTHER COMPLEX LITIGATION: A HANDBOOK FOR LAWYERS AND JUDGES 
(1982). 
32  See, e.g., In re Bendectin Prods. Liab. Litig., 749 F.2d 300 (6th Cir. 1984) (repudiating 
class certification of Bendectin claimants); In re N. Dist. of Cal. Dalkon Shield Prod. Liab. 
Litig., 693 F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1982) (rejecting class certification of nationwide punitive dam-
age class for Dalkon Shield claimants); Yandle v. PPG Indus., Inc., 65 F.R.D. 566 (E.D. Tex. 
1974) (rejection of proposed class of asbestos claimants for failure to satisfy Rule 23(b) pre-
dominance and superiority requirements). 
33  See In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 145 (2d Cir. 1987); In re Sch. Asbes-
tos Litig., 789 F.2d 996 (3d Cir. 1986); Jenkins v. Raymark Indus., 782 F.2d 468 (5th Cir. 
1986). 
34  See, e.g., In re Bendectin Litig., 857 F.2d 290 (6th Cir. 1988) (trifurcated trial of causa-
tion and liability); In re Beverly Hills Fire Litig., 695 F.2d 207 (6th Cir. 1982) (bifurcated 
trial of causation and liability); Jenkins v. Raymark Indus., 109 F.R.D. 269 (E.D. Tex. 1985), 
aff’d, 782 F.2d 468 (5th Cir. 1985) (reversed bifurcated trial). 
35  See, e.g., Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 160 F.R.D. 544 (E.D. La. 1995), rev’d, 84 F.3d 
734 (5th Cir. 1996) (certification of Rule 23(b)(3) limited issue class in nicotine addiction 
litigation; certification limited to core liability issues); Jenkins, 109 F.R.D. at 269 (limited 
issue trial of state of the art defense and liability for punitive damages); Agent Orange, 818 
F.2d at 166–67 (limited issues certification for defense of defendant’s status as a government 
contractor); Payton v. Abbott Labs, 83 F.R.D. 382 (D. Mass. 1979), vacated, 100 F.R.D. 336 
(D. Mass. 1983) (limited issues trial in DES litigation). See generally, MANUAL FOR 
COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 22.75 (2004) (Issues Classes). 
36  See Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 767, 782–87 (9th Cir. 1996) (sampling for dis-
covery and aggregated trial of damages); In re Shell Oil Refinery, 136 F.R.D. 588 (E.D. La. 
1991), aff’d sub nom. Watson v. Shell Oil Co., 979 F.2d 1014 (5th Cir. 1992), reh’g granted, 
990 F.2d 805 (5th Cir. 1993), other reh’g, 53 F.3d 663 (5th Cir. 1994) (damage sampling 
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This decade of judicial class action innovation, which centered on develop-
ing efficient means for managing and resolving mass tort litigation, also intro-
duced novel roles for judicial surrogates such as magistrates and special mas-
ters.38 Prior to the advent of the mass tort litigation inundating the courts, the 
appointment of special masters generally had been limited to a narrow universe 
of commercial law cases that needed an independent special master to conduct 
accounting functions for the courts. During the heyday of mass tort litigation, 
judges greatly expanded the role and function of special masters. 
Thus, judges across the country appointed numerous special masters to de-
vise multiphase trial plans in asbestos litigation;39 to conduct assessment of the 
existence of a limited fund;40 to assist with the settlement and implementation 
of the Agent Orange litigation and other mass tort litigation;41 to create data ba-
ses of claimants’ alleged injuries and damages;42 to supervise all pre-trial mat-
ters and motions;43 and to conduct discovery and hearings in the Philippine 
Marcos litigation.44 
                                                                                                                                
approved; case settled before rehearing); Cimino v. Raymark Indus., 1989 WL 253889 (E.D. 
Tex. 1989) (approving three phase trials with damage sampling), rev’d, 151 F.3d 297 (5th 
Cir. 1998). 
37  See Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 83 F.3d 610 (3d Cir. 1996), rev’d, Amchem Prods. 
Inc. v. Windsor, 117 S. Ct. 2231 (1997) (upholding asbestos settlement class); In re Asbestos 
Litig., 90 F.3d 963 (5th Cir. 1996), vacated, 117 S. Ct. 2503 (1997) (upholding asbestos set-
tlement class); In re Gen. Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55 
F.3d 768 (3d Cir. 1995) (generally approving concept of settlement class, but disapproving 
particular application to class claimants for lack of adequate settlement); In re A.H. Robins 
Co., 880 F.2d 709 (4th Cir. 1989) (upholding settlement class in Dalkon Shield litigation). 
38  See FED. R. CIV. P. 53 (special masters). 
39  See Jack Ratliff, Special Master’s Report in Cimino v. Raymark Industries, Inc., 10 REV. 
LITIG. 521 (1991) (describing appointment as special master by Judge Robert Parker of the 
Eastern District of Texas, to create a multiphase trial plan for the resolution of asbestos cas-
es). 
40  See In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 14 F.3d 726 (2d Cir. 1993) (appointment by 
Judge Weinstein of special master Marvin E. Frankel to assess the financial assets of the 
Keene Corporation for the purpose of determining the existence of a limited fund to certify a 
Rule 23(b)(1)(B) class action). 
41  See In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 129 F.R.D. 434 (E.D.N.Y. & S.D.N.Y. 1990) 
(appointment of special master Kenneth Feinberg to assist with settlement negotiations); see 
also In re DES Cases, 142 F.R.D. 58 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) (appointment of special master Ken-
neth Feinberg to assist with settlement negotiations of DES cases). 
42  See generally Francis E. McGovern, Resolving Mature Mass Tort Litigation, 69 B.U. L. 
REV. 659 (1989) (describing role as special master in collecting data in the Jenkins asbestos 
litigation in the Eastern District of Texas); Francis E. McGovern, Toward a Functional Ap-
proach for Managing Complex Litigation, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 440 (1986) (describing role as 
special master for Judge Lambros in Ohio, in conducting data collection for resolution of 
asbestos claims). 
43  See Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 991 F.2d 1080 (3d Cir. 1993) (up-
holding appointment of special master Dean Henry G. Manne in asbestos abatement litiga-
tion). 
44  See Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 767 (9th Cir. 1996) (describing the role of special 
master Sol Schreiber in conducting discovery and holding damages with regard to determin-
ing damages of claimants in the Marcos human rights litigation). 
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Finally, by the mid-1980s, aggregationist fever gripped the academic 
community. Hence, as the scholarly fraternity observed developments intro-
duced by aggregationist judges, the academy enthusiastically embraced these 
novel judicial experiments in the expansive deployment of the class action rule 
to resolve mass torts. The evolving mass tort landscape inspired an outpouring 
of academic articles commenting on, approving of, and suggesting new innova-
tive techniques for the class action rule.45 In some instances, a synergetic rela-
tionship developed between the judiciary and the academy, with researchers 
and professors offering academic support for some of the innovative initiatives 
utilized by courts, such as statistical sampling of damages.46 Indeed, some law 
professors became personally invested as aggregationists when they assumed 
roles as special masters or expert witnesses in these cases47—or in some in-
stances, as counsel involved in the litigation.48 Generally, critical reaction to the 
aggregationist movement, in this period, was muted and largely ignored in 
practice.49 
Thus, the first great age of aggregationist fervor, between 1986 and 1996, 
resulted in innovative expansion of the class action rule without actual amend-
ment of Rule 23 itself. The activities of the aggregationist judges and their ad-
vocates did not go unnoticed; in some quarters, at least, critics began to ques-
tion whether Rule 23 permitted such judicial activism in the mass tort litigation 
arena.50 Consequently, the ferment in the lower federal courts inspired the Ad-
visory Committee on Civil Rules to place a reconsideration of Rule 23 on its 
agenda in the early 1990s.51 This round of rule revision lasted from 1991 
                                                        
45  The favorable academic commentary on judicial developments in mass tort litigation in 
the decade between 1986–1996 is substantial. See, e.g., David Rosenberg, Class Actions for 
Mass Torts: Doing Individual Justice by Collective Means, 62 IND. L.J. 561 (1987); David 
Rosenberg, The Casual Connection in Mass Tort Exposure Cases: A “Public Law” Vision of 
the Tort System, 97 HARV. L. REV. 851 (1984). 
46  See, e.g., Michael J. Saks & Peter David Blanck, Justice Improved: The Unrecognized 
Benefits of Aggregation and Sampling in the Trial of Mass Torts, 44 STAN. L. REV. 815 
(1992), cited with approval in In re Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 109 F.3d 1016, 1020 (5th Cir. 
1997); In re Estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos Hum. Rights Litig., 910 F. Supp. 1460, 1467–68 
(D. Haw. 1995) (“The Court finds persuasive the analysis of Professors Saks and Blanck in 
their discussion that aggregate trials do not violate due process.” (footnote omitted)). 
47  See McGovern, supra note 42. 
48  Professor Arthur R. Miller, then a Harvard law professor, argued in favor (on appeal) of 
class certification of the School Asbestos litigation in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in 
1986, and the Castano tobacco class litigation in the Eastern District of Louisiana in 1996. 
See Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 1996); In re Sch. Asbestos Litig., 
789 F.2d 996 (3d Cir. 1986). 
49  See, e.g., Jay Tidmarsh, Unattainable Justice: The Form of Complex Litigation and the 
Limits of Judicial Power, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1683 (1992); Roger H. Transgrud, Mass 
Trials in Mass Tort Cases: A Dissent, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 69 (1985). 
50  See generally Richard L. Marcus, They Can’t Do That, Can They? Tort Reform Via Rule 
23, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 858 (1995). 
51  See WORKING PAPERS OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES ON PROPOSED 
AMENDMENTS TO CIVIL RULE 23, 1, 1–4 (1997); Proposed Rules, 167 F.R.D. 523, 539 (1996) 
(presenting a proposed addition of new Rule 23(b)(4)); Richard Marcus, Shoes That Did Not 
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through 1997, but the Advisory Committee held in abeyance any radical 
amendment of Rule 23 pending the Supreme Court’s decisions in the twin as-
bestos settlement classes.52 
It was perhaps inevitable that procedural backlash would set in as judges 
tested the limitations of their authority under the Rules Enabling Act.53 Thus, 
the great aggregationist movement of the 1980s–1990s came to somewhat of a 
crashing halt with a trifecta of appellate decisions in 1985–1986 that effectively 
rejected the ability of district court judges to continue to certify mass tort cas-
es.54 By the end of the decade, the Supreme Court hammered the final nails in 
the mass tort litigation coffin with its repudiation of the comprehensive settle-
ment classes in Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor and Ortiz v. Fibreboard 
Corp.55 In the Court’s Ortiz decision, Justice Souter took especial pains to ad-
monish federal court judges against any further “adventurous” use of the class 
action rule.56 The great era of experimentation with the Rule 23 class action 
substantially was over. 
Yet class action litigation did not die as a consequence of the great 1985–
86 appellate rout. Instead, plaintiffs’ class action counsel retreated to more hos-
pitable state court forums. Class action litigation performed the equivalent of 
going underground—in this instance, to state courts. The plaintiffs’ bar reacted 
by regrouping and retreating—many attorneys determined to avoid federal 
courts altogether, and instead to pursue class litigation in state courts. This re-
treat to state courts ushered in a decade of rapidly expanding state court class 
action litigation, accompanied by forum-shopping for favorable venues and the 
emergence of so-called “judicial hell-holes,” so labeled because of the propen-
sity of certain state courts to provide quick and easy class certification on the 
pleadings alone. 
The ascendance of state court class litigation and easy class certification in 
state court forums precipitated its own backlash, which eventually resulted in 
efforts by the corporate defense bar to enact the Class Action Fairness Act 
                                                                                                                                
Drop, 46 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 637, 642–43 (2013) (noting withdrawal of the proposed 
Rule 23(b)(4) settlement class proposal and massive negative reaction to proposal). 
52  See Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815 (1999); Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 
521 U.S. 591 (1997); see also Linda S. Mullenix, Professor Ed Cooper: Zen Minimalist, 
46 MICH. J.L. REFORM 661 (2013) (discussing the Rule 23 proposed amendments in this 
period, and the failure of the Advisory Committee to take any action). 
53  28 U.S.C. §§ 2071–72 (2012). 
54  See Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 1996) (rejection of class certifica-
tion in tobacco litigation); In re Am. Med. Sys., Inc., 75 F.3d 1069 (6th Cir. 1996) (rejection 
of class certification in penile implant litigation); In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 
1293 (7th Cir. 1995) (rejection of class certification in tainted blood products litigation). 
55  See supra note 52. 
56  See Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 845 (“Finally, if we needed further counsel against adventurous 
application of Rule 23(b)(1)(B), the Rules Enabling Act and the general doctrine of constitu-
tional avoidance would jointly sound a warning of the serious constitutional concerns that 
come with any attempt to aggregate individual tort claims on a limited fund rationale.”). 
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(“CAFA”) of 2005.57 CAFA provided a mechanism for corporate defendants to 
remove state class actions to federal court, where defendants could rely on the 
body of restrictive federal class action jurisprudence to defeat proposed class 
certification.58 CAFA’s legislative history clearly suggests that the legislative 
purpose in enacting CAFA was to provide corporate defendants with an alter-
native forum to, and some relief from, state court venues that unfairly favored 
class action plaintiffs. 
After 2005, then, this new round of class action backlash advanced through 
Congressional enactment of CAFA had substantially succeeded in transferring 
class litigation back to federal court pursuant to CAFA’s removal provisions.59 
However, plaintiffs’ class action lawyers who had been made gun-shy by the 
restrictive 1990s class action decisions, made the strategic decision to bypass 
class litigation if possible. By 2005, then, plaintiffs’ enthusiasm for class litiga-
tion had been tempered and was replaced by a new appreciation of non-class 
techniques for resolving complex disputes. 
As a consequence, a new generation of aggregationists emerged that in-
cluded some of the old aggregationists of the 1980s, but a different cohort of 
federal judges and a younger generation of academicians eager to embrace in-
novative ideas for resolving massive, complex cases outside the confines of the 
class action rule. Like one’s parents’ old music, for this new generation of pro-
ceduralists the class action rule seems a dated (if not embarrassing) passion of a 
previous generation of proceduralists. 
II. THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE AGGREGATE LITIGATION MOVEMENT IN 
THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 
In the post-CAFA era, the resolution of large-scale litigation has shifted 
away from Rule 23 class action auspices to innovative use of the federal multi-
district litigation (“MDL”) procedure.60 This is not without its own irony. Con-
gress enacted the MDL statute in 1968, two years after the 1966 amendment of 
Rule 23 that gave us the modern class action rule. The impetus behind creation 
of the MDL procedure was to assist the federal courts in dealing with electronic 
products antitrust litigation of that era,61 but MDL procedure clearly remained a 
sort of statutory stepchild of the more prominent class action rule. 
Indeed, throughout much of the mass tort era of the 1980s and 1990s, the 
Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation chiefly declined to create mass tort 
                                                        
57  See Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, § 5, 119 Stat. 4 (2005). 
58  See 28 U.S.C. § 1453 (2012) (concerning CAFA removal provision). 
59  Id. 
60  28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1976). 
61  See Wilson W. Herndon, Section 1407 and Antitrust Multidistrict Litigation—The First 
Decade, 47 ANTITRUST L.J. 1161 (1979); Stanley J. Levy, Complex Multidistrict Litigation 
and the Federal Courts, 40 FORDHAM L. REV. 41 (1971); John T. McDermott, The Judicial 
Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, 57 F.R.D. 215 (1973). 
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MDLs as a procedural means to resolve these cases.62 This resistance to use of 
MDL auspices for mass tort litigation abated somewhat in 1991, when the Pan-
el finally relented and, in light of the perceived growing asbestos litigation cri-
sis, authorized creation of an asbestos MDL.63 Nonetheless, recourse to MDL 
forums and procedures during the heyday of mass tort class action experimen-
tation remained relatively rare. 
The modern era of expansive use of the MDL auspices perhaps began with 
the Vioxx pharmaceutical litigation, which the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict 
Litigation approved for MDL treatment in 200564—notably, the very same year 
that CAFA went into effect. As indicated above, once CAFA began to divert 
state class actions back into federal court, plaintiffs’ attorneys strategically re-
grouped to explore alternative means, other than the class action, to resolve 
large-scale disputes. Thus, in the twenty-first century as class action jurispru-
dence grew more restrictive and exacting,65 it became increasingly difficult for 
plaintiffs to plead class actions,66 obtain class certification,67 or accomplish set-
tlement classes after Amchem and Ortiz.68 In light of these and other considera-
ble impediments, attorneys involved in large-scale litigation perhaps rightly 
questioned whether it made sense to pursue class litigation under Rule 23. 
All actors in the complex litigation arena are well aware that virtually all 
class actions eventually settle and never go to trial. Once a court certifies a 
class action, the parties typically default to settlement mode and negotiate a 
classwide settlement subject to judicial scrutiny and approval.69 Thus, in most 
complex litigation, settlement is the focal point of the litigation.70 By 2005, 
                                                        
62  See In re A.H. Robins Co., “Dalkon Shield” IUD Products Liab. Litig. (No. II), 610 F. 
Supp. 1099 (J.P.M.L. 1985); In re Sch. Asbestos Prods. Liab. Litig., 606 F. Supp. 713 
(J.P.M.L. 1985) (declining to create MDL for school asbestos litigation); In re Ortho Pharm. 
“Lippes Loop” Prods. Liab. Litig., 447 F. Supp. 1073 (J.P.M.L. 1978) (declining to create 
Lippes Loop MDL); In re Asbestos & Asbestos Insulation Material Prods. Liab. Litig., 431 
F. Supp. 906 (J.P.M.L. 1977) (declining to create an asbestos MDL). 
63  See In re Asbestos Prods. Liab. Litig. (No. VI), 771 F. Supp. 415 (J.P.M.L. 1991) (ap-
proving creation of an asbestos MDL in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania). 
64  See In Re Vioxx Prod. Liab. Litig., 360 F. Supp. 2d 1352 (J.P.M.L. 2005) (148 total ac-
tions pending in forty-one federal district courts sought to recover from a drug company for 
damages as a result of alleged increased health risks caused by taking a certain anti-
inflammatory drug). The panel found that “centralization under Section 1407 in the Eastern 
District of Louisiana will serve the convenience of the parties and witnesses and promote the 
just and efficient conduct of the litigation.” Id. at 1353–54. The panel also noted that consol-
idation was “necessary in order to eliminate duplicative discovery, avoid inconsistent pretrial 
rulings, and conserve the resources of the parties, their counsel and the judiciary.” Id. at 
1354. 
65  In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305 (2009) (heightened standards for 
satisfaction of “rigorous analysis” standard for class certification motions). 
66  Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (plausible pleading standard for anti-
trust class actions). 
67  Wal-Mart Stores v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011). 
68  See supra note 52. 
69  FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e). 
70  RICHARD NAGAREDA, MASS TORTS IN A WORLD OF SETTLEMENT (2007). 
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plaintiffs’ attorneys and defense counsel realized that both sides profitably 
could use the previously underutilized MDL auspices as a mutually advanta-
geous means to resolve large-scale litigation. In essence, this new form of ag-
gregate litigation gave primacy to settlement negotiation, skipping the bother-
some processes of class certification at the front end, and settlement approval at 
the back end, altogether. 
On both sides of the litigation docket, plaintiffs’ attorneys and defense 
counsel had good reasons to endorse a shift to a new MDL modality for resolv-
ing complex litigation outside the confines of the class action rule. For plain-
tiffs, accomplishing a settlement under MDL auspices that would not be subject 
to Rule 23 meant that plaintiffs were no longer subject to the heightened class 
action standards and more restrictive jurisprudence that developed since the late 
1990s. Plaintiffs no longer had to hazard the perils of expensive class certifica-
tion proceedings and a class certification denial, which effectively would end 
the litigation. They could just proceed to settlement negotiations and attorney 
fee awards. 
On the defense side of the docket, with the shift toward more robust re-
course to MDL procedures, defense counsel essentially ceded the battleground 
of class certification. Similar to plaintiffs’ class counsel, the bypassing of Rule 
23 also spared defense clients the considerable expense and burdens of class 
certification discovery and proceedings. On the other hand, defense attorneys 
appreciated the shift to MDL auspices because it gave them more free rein in 
negotiating settlements to their advantage, because settlement and fee agree-
ments would not be subject to the judicial scrutiny and approval process re-
quired by Rule 23(e). 
As indicated above, the Vioxx litigation that was settled through MDL aus-
pices provided a prototype of the new twenty-first century aggregate dispute 
resolution paradigm.71 The Vioxx settlement was pursued after creation of the 
                                                        
71  See Richard A. Nagareda, Embedded Aggregation in Civil Litigation, 95 CORNELL L. 
REV. 1105, 1111 (2010) (“The Vioxx settlement took the form not of a class action settle-
ment but of a contract between the defendant-manufacturer Merck & Company, Inc. and the 
small number of law firms within the plaintiffs’ bar with large inventories of Vioxx clients. 
The contract described a grid-like compensation framework for the ultimate cashing out of 
Vioxx claims, but Vioxx claimants themselves literally were nonparties to that contract. The 
enforcement mechanism for the deal consisted not of preclusion but of contractual terms 
whereby each signatory law firm obligated itself to do two things: to recommend the deal to 
each of its Vioxx clients and—‘to the extent permitted by’ applicable ethical strictures—to 
disengage from the representation of any client who might decline the firm’s advice to take 
the deal. Absent a signatory law firm’s commitment of its entire Vioxx client inventory to 
the deal, Merck would have the discretion to reject the firm’s enrollment such that none of 
the firm’s clients would be eligible to participate.” (footnotes omitted)); See Settlement 
Agreement Between Merck & Co., Inc., and the Counsel Listed on the Signature  
Pages Hereto (Nov. 9, 2007), available at http://www.beasleyallen.com/alerts/attachments 
/Vioxx%20Master%20Settlement%20Agreement.pdf. Other scholars noted the trend toward 
aggregate settlements even before the Vioxx settlement. See generally Howard M. Erichson, 
Informal Aggregation: Procedural and Ethical Implications of Coordination Among Counsel 
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Vioxx MDL;72 essentially the attorneys crafted a complex settlement agreement 
that derived its legitimacy based on contract principles rather than Rule 23 class 
action due process requirements.73 And, notwithstanding an outpouring of criti-
cal commentary,74 the Vioxx deal provided a blueprint for numerous subsequent 
large-scale non-class aggregate settlements, including the Zyprexa litigation re-
solved in an MDL under Judge Jack Weinstein’s supervision.75 
The Vioxx and Zyprexa settlements, in turn, inspired the creation of the 
novel quasi-class action, intended to ameliorate some of the problems engen-
dered by the lack of judicial oversight of fee arrangements in MDL negotiated 
settlements. Judge Weinstein, both the creator of the quasi-class action and an 
old-school aggregationist, readily embraced the new-school aggregationist 
movement.76 
A number of consequences flowed from the Vioxx litigation. First, MDL 
proceedings have proliferated since 2005.77 If the 1980s and 1990s represented 
the high point of class litigation and experimentation, then MDL proceedings 
have replaced class litigation as the dominant form of complex litigation proce-
dure. No sooner does some product defect, pharmaceutical adverse event, or 
consumer harm manifest than the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation cre-
ates an MDL for that litigation. Second, both sides of the docket often invest 
considerable energy in forum-shopping for preferable MDL forums,78 which 
                                                                                                                                
in Related Lawsuits, 50 DUKE L.J. 381, 386 (2000) (citing prominent examples of aggregate 
settlements). 
72  See supra note 64. 
73  Nagareda, supra note 71. 
74  See, e.g., Sybil L. Dunlop & Steven D. Maloney, Justice Is Hard, Let’s Go Shopping! 
Trading Justice for Efficiency Under the New Aggregate Settlement Regime, 83 ST. JOHN’S 
L. REV. 521, 522–27, 541–42 (2009); Howard M. Erichson & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Con-
sent Versus Closure, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 265 (2011); Frank M. McClellan, The Vioxx Liti-
gation: A Critical Look at Trial Tactics, The Tort System, and the Roles of Lawyers in Mass 
Tort Litigation, 57 DEPAUL L. REV. 509 (2008). 
75  See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff, Private Claims, Aggregate Rights, 2008 SUP. CT. REV. 183 
(2008); Samuel Issacharoff & Robert H. Klonoff, The Public Value of Settlement, 78 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1177 (2009); David Marcus, Some Realism About Mass Torts, 75 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 1949 (2008); Francis E. McGovern, A Model State Mass Tort Settlement Statute, 80 
TUL. L. REV. 1809 (2006); Nagareda, supra note 71; Edward F. Sherman, The MDL Model 
for Resolving Complex Litigation if a Class Action Is Not Possible, 82 TUL. L. REV. 2205 
(2008); Charles Silver, Merging Roles: Mass Tort Lawyers as Agents and Trustees, 31 PEPP. 
L. REV. 301 (2004); Charles Silver & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Quasi-Class Action Method of 
Managing Multi-District Litigations: Problems and a Proposal, 63 VAND. L. REV. 107 
(2010). 
76  See Jeremy Hays, The Quasi-Class Action Model for Limiting Attorneys’ Fees in Multi-
district Litigation, 67 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 589 (2012); Linda S. Mullenix, Dubious 
Doctrines: The Quasi-Class Action, 80 U. CIN. L. REV. 389 (2011). 
77  See Willging & Lee, supra note 23 (reporting data collected by the Federal Judicial Cen-
ter on the increase in use of MDLs as opposed to class actions for resolution of complex cas-
es). 
78  See John G. Heyburn II, A View from the Panel: Part of the Solution, 82 TUL. L. REV. 
2225, 2241 (2008) (discussing the standards by which the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Lit-
igation selects the MDL forum, noting the propensity of some attorneys to attempt to “game 
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typically means locating an MDL forum with an accommodating judge. Third, 
former class action attorneys have diverted their energies toward gaining ap-
pointment as counsel in MDL proceedings, contributing to multiday skirmishes 
over such appointments, which in reality are surrogate battles over eventual at-
torney fee awards. Fourth, litigation adversaries are now able to negotiate set-
tlements in private, meaning that the settlements lack transparency and are not 
subject to judicial scrutiny. There are no guardians guarding the guardians. 
Whatever its myriad problems, class litigation has always been undergirded 
by considerable due process rights and protections,79 which provisions have 
been intended to safeguard class action members from collusive attorney be-
havior or self-dealing inadequate settlements.80 Ironically, actors in the new 
MDL arena prefer this modality to class litigation precisely because it liberates 
them from such oversight.81 The new Vioxx paradigm then, represents a trou-
bling triumph of contract law principles over constitutional due process. 
Similar to the rebellious child who turns on the values of his or her parents, 
so too has the new generation of aggregationists turned on the values of the old-
aggregationists. The twenty-first century aggregationists have little interest in 
reforming the class action rule. And, if they do, their recommendations fre-
quently are along extremist lines, such as eliminating class clients altogether,82 
or awarding 100 percent fees to class counsel.83 Simply, the new aggregation-
ists would reform the class action rule so that it doesn’t function like the class 
action rule. For the new aggregationists, Rule 23 is the problem, not the solu-
tion.84 Nonetheless, the new aggregationists have adopted much of the rhetoric 
of the 1980s class action debates—arguments based on efficiency and deter-
rence rationales85—and pressed this rhetoric into service in support of new non-
class arrangements. 
                                                                                                                                
the system”: “The Panel is particularly alert, however, to parties who may venture to use the 
MDL process for some substantive or procedural advantage, and will act to avert or deflect 
attempts by a party or parties to ‘game’ the system”). 
79  These include the requirement that a court certify a class action at the outset of the pro-
ceedings; insure that the class is adequately represented by class counsel and one or more 
class representatives; that notice and the right to opt-out be afforded in damage class actions; 
and that any proposed settlement be subjected to judicial scrutiny and approval. See FED. R. 
CIV. P. 23(a)(4), (c), (e). 
80  See Debra Lynn Bassett, Constructing Class Reality, 2006 B.Y.U.L. REV. 1415, 1445, 
1447 (2006) (“Accordingly, a shift away from the representative nature of class actions—a 
shift that would lower constitutional due process protections—should require especially 
careful scrutiny before recommendation.”). 
81  See supra note 75. 
82  See, e.g., S. Todd Brown, Plaintiff Control and Domination in Multidistrict Mass Torts, 
61 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 391, 392–95 (2013) (outlining the ways in which MDL litigation has 
liberated complex dispute resolution form the constraints of Rule 23 judicial oversight and 
benefited repeated player plaintiffs’ counsel in structuring favorable outcomes in the coun-
sels’ interests). 
83  See, e.g., Campos, Mass Torts and Due Process, supra note 23. 
84  See, e.g., Fitzpatrick, supra note 23. 
85  See supra notes 23, 75. 
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Finally, language is important. There is no better indicator of the sea-
change in thinking about complex litigation than the modification of language 
that has accompanied the new twenty-first century paradigm. Hence, the Amer-
ican Law Institute (“ALI”) denominated its study of twenty-first century com-
plex litigation as “The Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litigation.”86 In so 
doing, the ALI essentially ceded the primacy of the class action to newer pro-
cedural techniques, ultimately and controversially advocating in favor of the 
Vioxx model.87 
III. RETHINKING AGGREGATION AND DE-AGGREGATION 
As indicated above, in the twenty-first century the non-class aggregate set-
tlement pursued through MDL auspices effectively has replaced class litigation 
as the preferred modality for complex dispute resolution. This represents a tri-
umph of contract over constitution. The new aggregationist movement includes 
counsel from both sides of the docket, many federal judges, as well as a sub-
stantial academic following. 
The new aggregationist movement, however, is unlike the aggregationist 
movement of the 1980s–1990s, which centered on innovative, experimental us-
es of the class action rule. The new aggregationist movement instead has turned 
its back on the class action rule as an inconvenient impediment to resolving 
mass disputes. With this in mind, the current efforts of the Advisory Committee 
on Civil Rules to revisit and amend Rule 23 seem akin to the old trope of fid-
dling while Rome is burning. For practitioners who will continue to make re-
course to MDL proceedings as the preferred modality for resolving complex 
litigation, what the Advisory Committee might or might not do with Rule 23 in 
the future will make little difference. 
Ironically, the new aggregationist movement (scholarly version) resorts to 
old-style aggregationist rhetoric in support of this new MDL settlement para-
digm. Hence, the academic literature in praise of non-class aggregate settle-
ments is replete with reliance on the primary rationales supporting class litiga-
tion: i.e., compensation, deterrence, and efficiency.88 In this regard, the class 
action has been stood on its head and portrayed as subverting the very ration-
                                                        
86  AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION (2010). Several of the 
Reporters for the PRINCIPLES acted as attorneys or experts in the Vioxx litigation and hence 
became proponents of this model for resolving aggregate litigation, in preference to the class 
action model. 
87  See Bassett, supra note 80, at 1431 (“Thus, ‘aggregate litigation’ is a poor class action 
synonym because its overinclusiveness necessarily downplays and minimizes the distinctive 
representative nature of class actions. The primary significance of this linguistic develop-
ment is that it reflects an underlying conceptual movement. The use of ‘aggregate litigation’ 
as a synonym or substitute for ‘class action’ reflects an underlying movement in the legal 
literature to construct a new class action reality—a movement that, in the name of efficiency, 
would inherently and necessarily compromise existing due process protections for absent 
class members.”). 
88  See supra notes 23, 75. 
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ales it was intended to promote. Into this breach steps the non-class, MDL ag-
gregate settlement procedure. 
The new aggregationist movement has its enthusiasts and its detractors, but 
its critics appear to have had little impact on the proliferation of this new mode 
of aggregate dispute resolution. Skepticism about or criticism of non-class ag-
gregate settlements has not resulted in attorney behavior modification. In the 
class action arena, judicial oversight and appellate review had long served as a 
corrective to improper or over-reaching behavior. But with the advent of the 
MDL non-class aggregate settlements, there are virtually no means to control, 
review, or constrain the misconduct of attorneys participating in these supra-
judicial proceedings.89 
A major impetus for the great aggregationist movement that developed in 
the 1980s was the emergence of mass tort litigation, with a concomitant “crisis 
mentality” that spurred on several judges to explore means to resolve cases on a 
wholesale basis. This aggregationist movement also was predicated on the be-
lief that these mass tort claims could not be litigated individually, because this 
approach would overburden courts, cause unseemly delay, and contribute to 
waste and inefficiency. The aggregationist movement of the 1980s proceeded 
under the banner of justice delayed is justice denied. 
The history of aggregate dispute resolution represents a seamless thread 
running from the 1980s to the current non-class aggregate settlement. But what 
if there are no litigation crises, and what if claims are capable of being adjudi-
cated on an individual basis? What if the aggregationist movements—both old 
and new—have been constructed based on jurisprudential conceits that lack 
substance? 
Judge Eduardo C. Robreno of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania has pro-
vided some insight into these questions, as well as supplied some interesting 
answers.90 Judge Robreno inherited supervision of the nationwide federal 
MDL-875 asbestos litigation docket in October 2008.91 In the ensuing years, 
Judge Robreno developed and instituted a case management plan to resolve all 
the asbestos cases on the MDL-875 docket. Significantly, the program he fash-
ioned accomplished the resolution of these asbestos claims on an individual, 
case-by-case basis.92 The success of this judicially managed program—dealing 
with the seemingly most intractable mass tort litigation—gives pause to those 
                                                        
89  It is precisely this lack of judicial control or oversight of MDL non-class aggregate set-
tlement that inspired Judge Weinstein to invent the quasi-class action, as a means to exert 
control over attorney fees in these non-class settlements. See supra note 76. Proponents of 
the new non-class settlement modality protested Judge Weinstein’s invocation of the quasi-
class action because it interfered with their contractual right to negotiate and consummate 
attorney fees in any way they desired. See Silver & Miller, supra note 75. 
90  Robreno, supra note 25. 
91  Id. Judge Robreno was designated to preside over MDL-875 (the asbestos MDL). 
92  Id. at 126–46. 
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who contend that mass tort litigation involving thousands of claimants cannot 
be resolved on an individualized basis. 
Asbestos litigation was the seminal mass tort litigation of the 1980s, and its 
procedural history provides an interesting parable about dispute resolution mo-
dalities. As Judge Robreno documents, the flood of asbestos litigation began in 
earnest in the late 1970s after the Fifth Circuit approved a strict liability theory 
in these cases.93 For approximately fifteen years the Judicial Panel on Multidis-
trict Litigation resisted creation of an asbestos MDL, but after the Judicial Con-
ference issued a report on the nationwide crisis in asbestos litigation, the Panel 
relented and finally created an asbestos MDL-875 in 1991.94 
The fate of asbestos litigation in the MDL-875 docket over the next decade 
presented a complicated narrative of class action failure. In 1991–1992, upon 
the urging of MDL Judge Charles R. Weiner and under the subsequent MDL 
supervision of Judge Lowell Reed, counsel representing asbestos plaintiffs and 
a consortium of asbestos defendants (the CCR), negotiated the first-ever na-
tionwide class action settlement of all asbestos claims.95 Although Judge Reed 
approved this class action deal, known as the Georgine settlement, both the 
Third Circuit and the Supreme Court eventually repudiated the settlement class 
in 1997.96 
The collapse of the Georgine class settlement within MDL-875 placed as-
bestos litigants, effectively, back at square one. Judge Robreno summarizes the 
consequence of this procedural history: 
After nearly twenty years of intensive litigation in the federal courts, it 
seemed apparent to the court that efforts toward aggregation of cases and con-
solidation of claims had proven ineffective. Aggregation stopped progress on in-
dividual cases while the parties and the court worked on global solutions. Once 
the global solutions proved unfeasible, the parties did not return to the task of 
processing the cases individually. Ultimately, neither the court nor the parties 
were ready, willing, or able to move cases to trial and settlement. This stage of 
litigation led some litigants to refer to MDL-875 as a “black hole,” where cases 
disappeared forever from the active dockets of the court.97 
In the face of this massive failure of aggregative efforts to resolve asbestos 
litigation, Judge Robreno instead determined to employ his judicial case man-
agement skills toward creating a model that would resolve his asbestos docket 
on an individualized basis: 
Given the apparent failure of aggregation and consolidation, the court de-
termined that each case would be “disaggregated” or “deconstructed” into the 
lowest common denominator and proceed as “one plaintiff-one claim.” The pur-
                                                        
93  Id. at 105 (citing Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1092 (5th Cir. 
1973)). 
94  Id. at 106. 
95  Id. at 112–13. 
96  Id. at 113. See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997). 
97  Robreno, supra note 25, at 126 (footnotes omitted). 
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pose was to separate each case, and within each case, each claim against each 
defendant so that each claim could stand on its own merit. 
Cases with multiple plaintiffs were severed into separate individual cases. 
Once severed, each case was placed on an individual scheduling order setting 
forth reasonable but fixed deadlines for completion of discovery and filing of 
dispositive motions. In issuing the orders placing each case on its own path, the 
court was committing to hands-on management of the cases. Once the court 
demonstrated it was ready to adjudicate cases on a fast track basis, the lawyers 
readily joined in. Each order and the deadlines in the order reflected the realities 
of each case. In other words, the court was now committed to systematic differ-
ential diagnostics—one size would not fit all.98 
After organizing court personnel and setting up a communications system, 
including a comprehensive website, Judge Robreno then implemented a six-
step process to resolve each case.99 This process consisted of: (1) transfer of all 
outstanding federal asbestos cases to the Eastern District of Pennsylvania,100 (2) 
severance of all cases into single plaintiffs’ motions (cases severed into one-
plaintiff, one claim),101 (3) requirement of plaintiff’s submission of medical re-
ports,102 (4) institution of show cause hearings,103(5) issuance of scheduling or-
ders for discovery,104 and (5) provision for summary judgment motions.105 Al-
though the court initially contemplated—consistent with the requirement of the 
MDL statute—that cases would be returned to their transferor district for trial, 
Judge Robreno reports that cases that had been transferred and consolidated in 
MDL-875 were rarely remanded to the originating court.106 
The results of implementation of Judge Robreno’s program are impressive. 
His docket consisted of both so-called land-based asbestos case and maritime 
asbestos cases (the “MARDOC” docket). He reports that since 2006, 186,524 
cases were transferred to MDL-875. Of those cases, 183,545 have been re-
solved, leaving 2,979 cases on the MDL docket.107 
In light of these compelling results, Judge Robreno offers some lessons to 
be learned from his experience managing the largest and oldest personal injury 
                                                        
98  Id. at 127 (footnotes omitted). 
99  Id. at 127–32, 135. 
100  Id. at 135–36. 
101  Id. at 136–37. 
102  Id. at 137–38. 
103  Id. at 139–41. Judge Roberno reports that: 
After the conclusion of the hearing, each case received one of five different types of orders: (1) a 
dismissal for lack of prosecution (if no counsel appeared with information on that plaintiff); (2) a 
Rule 41(b) dismissal; (3) a Rule 41(b) dismissal with a transfer to the bankruptcy only docket; 
(4) a scheduling order allowing between 90 and 120 days for fact discovery; or (5) a referral to 
one of the magistrate judges for pretrial proceedings. 
Id. 
104  Id. at 141. 
105  Id. at 141–43. 
106  Id. at 143–44. 
107  Id. at 180–81. Of the 186,524, 123,157 were part of the land-based docket and 63,367 
part of the MARDOC docket. 
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mass tort litigation. First, he questions whether, in retrospect, a national MDL 
was necessary at all to handle the asbestos litigation.108 Second, he opines that 
unless courts establish a “toll gate” at the entrance to litigation, non-meritorious 
cases will clog the process. Therefore, he urges courts to establish procedures at 
an early point by which each plaintiff is required to provide facts to support 
their claims by expert diagnostic reports or risk dismissal of their case.109 
Fourth, he recommends that each case be disaggregated or deconstructed into 
the lowest common denominator, separating each claim against each defendant 
to stand on its own merits.110 Fifth, he contends that any trial should not be bi-
furcated or trifurcated.111 
Judge Robreno’s experience in resolving his massive asbestos docket has 
made him chary of aggregative solutions to mass injury litigation, which he 
characterizes as falsely waiting for “Superman.” Thus, commenting on the fail-
ure of aggregate litigation, Judge Robreno concludes: 
The consolidation or aggregation of large numbers of cases distorts the liti-
gation and the settlement process. Aside from the significant due process issues 
raised by forcing parties to litigate or settle cases in groups, aggregation pro-
motes the filing of cases of uncertain merit. The incentive becomes the number 
of cases that can be filed, not the relative merit of the individual case. Addition-
ally, while the court searches for global solutions, the individual cases are not at-
tended to by either the court or the individual lawyers. Since litigation or settle-
ment is to be determined in mass, or at least in groups, there is no perceived 
need by the parties to litigate each case separately. While the parties wait for 
‘superman’ to resolve the litigation, the cases linger.112 
In order to avoid the sometimes perverse incentives that adhere to aggre-
gate litigation, and the often less-than-satisfying results, Judge Robreno notes 
that it takes a dedicated commitment of judicial resources to implement a pro-
gram such as the one he designed to handle his asbestos docket.113 In addition, 
he admonishes that we ought to let lawyers be lawyers and judges be judges,114 
and that any system designed to adjudicate cases should manifestly lack an 
agenda that undermines litigants’ confidence in the process.115 
CONCLUSION 
This article began as an appreciation of Professor Steve Subrin’s long and 
illustrious career as a teacher, scholar, and guru in the field of civil procedure. 
It has endeavored to locate the arc of his professional career in tandem with the 
                                                        
108  Id. at 186. 
109  Id. at 186–87. 
110  Id. at 187. 
111  Id. 
112  Id. 
113  Id. at 187–88. 
114  Id. at 188. 
115  Id. 
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arc of aggregate litigation, from class action litigation in the 1960s through 
non-class MDL procedures in the twenty-first century. As Professor Subrin re-
mains the great expositor of the equity basis for the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, it seems appropriate to end on the grace note asking what equity has 
wrought in the field of aggregate litigation. 
During the 1980s and 1990s, the heyday of mass tort litigation, judges and 
scholars invoked equity as the jurisprudential basis to provide courts with sub-
stantial leeway to fashion new means for collective relief through experimental 
use of the class action rule. When the Supreme Court declined to follow on this 
adventurous journey, the power of flexible, equity-based class actions to reme-
dy large-scale grievances subsided considerably. As indicated above, the de-
nouement of the class action has been accompanied by the rise of MDL pro-
ceedings and non-class settlements under the umbrella of those proceedings. 
Before the advent of the Vioxx settlement, complex litigation that was 
transferred and consolidated under MDL auspices almost always resulted in 
settlements. In this regard MDL procedure proved to be a powerful procedural 
mechanism for resolving large-scale dispersed litigation. But such settlements 
typically were consummated through a class action settlement within the MDL 
and subject to the scrutiny of the MDL court. Twenty-first century MDL pro-
cedure, on the contrary, has simply eliminated the class action role in complex 
dispute resolution after litigation has been transferred to the MDL forum. 
This new aggregate settlement model is unlike the old in that it evades ju-
dicial oversight and invites dubious conduct that may be disadvantageous to 
claimants within the group. While the new paradigm finds admirers in utilitari-
anism and economic efficiency, it also inspires nervousness and disquiet among 
believers in litigant autonomy and democratic participation in the adjudicative 
process. 
In surveying the forty years of aggregate litigation that has spanned Profes-
sor Subrin’s professional life, the prevailing zeitgeist of different periods de-
serves some reflection. In the early days of class action litigation in the 1960s 
and 1970s, attorneys were instilled with an exuberant sense of idealism that 
made the class action the handmaiden of public institutional reform litigation. 
The class action decades of the 1980s and 1990s were infused with a spirit of 
American pragmatism: as one federal court put it, in approving an unprecedent-
ed asbestos class action: “Necessity moves us to change and invent.”116 
In contrast, in the twenty-first century the pervasive aggregate litigation 
conversation centers on attorney fees, with academic justifications for attorney 
fee awards filling the law reviews.117 Hence, an unattractive sub rosa “greed is 
                                                        
116  Jenkins v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 782 F.2d 468, 473 (5th Cir. 1986). 
117  See, e.g., Lynn A. Baker & Charles Silver, Fiduciaries and Fees: Preliminary Thoughts, 
79 FORDHAM L. REV. 1833 (2011); Lester Brickman, ABA Regulation of Contingency Fees: 
Money Talks, Ethics Walks, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 247, 248 (1996) (noting that “standard 
contingency fees” are “usually thirty-three percent to forty percent of gross recoveries”); 
Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, Attorney Fees in Class Action Settlements: An 
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good” mentality seems to pervade the modern aggregate litigation landscape; 
the idealism that characterized old-school class action lawyers seems a naive 
artifact of an earlier era. 
And while some of the old-school aggregationists have embraced the new-
school aggregation paradigm, many (including myself), have not. For those 
who have not, it is difficult to reconcile the current aggregation models with the 
idealism that infused group litigation in the first place. Arguably, there may be 
reasons to approve of the new aggregationist paradigm, but there are as many 
compelling reasons not to. Professor Subrin, by age and temperament, seems to 
be an old-school aggregationist (1960s–1970s version), but we have few clues 
as to his appreciation of the new landscape of twenty-first century aggregate 
litigation. 
For old-school aggregationists who have begun a process of rethinking (or 
re-education about) the virtues of aggregation, perhaps a good starting point is 
an appreciation of the fact that—contrary to received wisdom—it is not impos-
sible to adjudicate large-scale dispersed litigation on an individualized basis. 
Judge Robreno has shown the way. In addition, as the judge points out, not eve-
ry claim rushed into aggregation is meritorious or deserving of settlement with-
in a collective redress mechanism. 
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